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Abstract
We examine the persistence of monopolies in markets with in-
novations when the outcome of research is uncertain. We show
that for low success probabilities of research, the incumbent can
seldom preempt the potential entrant. Then the eﬃciency eﬀect
outweighs the replacement eﬀect. It is vice versa for high prob-
abilities. Moreover, the incumbent specializes in “safe” research
and the potential entrant in “risky” research. We also show that
the probability of entry has an inverted U-shape in the success
probability. Since even at the peak entry is rather unlikely, the
persistence of the monopoly is high.
Keywords: Persistence of Monopoly; Eﬃciency Eﬀect; Replacement Ef-
fect; Stochastic Innovations.
JEL Classiﬁcation: L12, O31.
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper takes a new look at monopoly persistence in markets with
innovations. The extensive literature on the subject has discussed this
issue in terms of the eﬃciency eﬀect and the replacement eﬀect. Since
competition destroys proﬁts, the eﬃciency eﬀect predicts that the incum-
bent’s incentive to remain a monopolist through innovating is at least as
great as the entrant’s incentive to become a duopolist. The replacement
eﬀect (Arrow, 1962) predicts the opposite: The entrant’s incentive to in-
novate is higher than the incumbent’s because only the incumbent takes
into account that innovating replaces its existing technology. According
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to the classical work of Gilbert and Newbery (1982; henceforth GN) the
eﬃciency eﬀect determines the outcome, whereas in a seminal paper by
Reinganum (1983; henceforth RE) it is the replacement eﬀect.1 We build
a unifying model in which both eﬀects are present. We allow for un-
certainty with respect to the outcomes of innovative activities and show
that the success probability of research determines the relative strength
of both eﬀects.
We consider a monopolized market, where the ﬁrst-moving incum-
bent may be able to discourage the potential entrant from investing in
research by investing itself.2 The outcomes of research activities are un-
certain. Therefore, preemption is less than perfect. For high success
probabilities we obtain a result in the spirit of GN: preemption is almost
perfect so the eﬃciency eﬀect is the driving force. Intuitively, since the
success probability is high the potential entrant’s expected proﬁt from
research greatly depends on the incumbent’s research decision. Hence,
it is very likely that the incumbent can and does preempt the potential
entrant. For low success probabilities the same argument applies in re-
verse, i.e., the incumbent can hardly preempt and so the replacement
eﬀect predominates. This result is in the spirit of RE.
These results imply that research with a high success probability is
more likely done by the incumbent than by the potential entrant, and it
is vice versa for research with a low success probability. In this sense,
incumbents specialize in“safe”research, and potential entrants in“risky”
research. We also show that research undertaken by potential entrants
is, on average, “riskier” than that of incumbent ﬁrms. Moreover, the
probability of entry has—at least roughly—an inverted U-shape in the
success probability of research. Since even at the peak the probability of
entry is only a quarter, the persistence of monopoly is high.
We also explore the normative aspects of our model. We consider the
second best world in which pricing cannot be regulated and show that,
apart from one exception, ﬁrms never overinvest and may underinvest.
When the incumbent preempts the potential entrant and the innovation
is non-drastic, overinvestment may occur.3 Intuitively, this holds when
in case that incumbent’s research is successful (i) the monopoly price is
almost the same as when the incumbent would have the old technology (so
1See also the debate in Reinganum (1984) and Gilbert and Newbery (1984).
2The idea that a dominant ﬁrm might use its investment decision as a strategic
device to persuade a potential entrant not to enter stems from Spence (1977) and
Dixit (1980). They consider capacity investments.
3An innovation is called drastic if it is so large that the innovative entrant is
eﬀectively unconstrained by incumbent’s competition. It can charge monopoly prices
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that the consumer surplus is hardly increased) and (ii) the incumbent’s
proﬁt only slightly improves relative to the investment costs.
The research process considered by GN is commonly interpreted as an
auction. As an extension, we integrate such an auction process into our
model. This changes our results: regardless of the success probability,
the incumbent will always outbid the entrant if the innovation is non-
drastic. So entry will never occur. This replicates GN’s result in a more
general framework which allows for uncertainty of the research process.
Our paper is related to the literature on the persistence of monopoly
in markets with innovations, which is surveyed by Gilbert (2006). The
relation of our model to GN and RE is discussed later. Denicolo (2001)
and Etro (2004) consider a research process of the RE type where the
replacement eﬀect disappears, since the aggregate R&D eﬀort is inde-
pendent of the incumbent’s decision. Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) show
that in RE’s model, when the innovation is non-drastic, the eﬃciency ef-
fect may outweigh the replacement eﬀect. With diﬀerent outcomes being
possible, there is, however, no clear-cut result.4 Our model delivers clear
and intuitive results without any assumption on whether the innovation
is drastic or not.
We oﬀer a novel explanation to the question why entrants do riskier
research than incumbents. Existing literature on this question empha-
sizes other explanations. While Kihlstrom and Laﬀont (1979) look at
diﬀerences in the risk-attitudes of ﬁrms, De Meza and Southey (1996)
consider excessive optimism of entrepreneurs. Scherer and Ross (1990,
Ch. 17) blame the bureaucracy in large companies. Baumol (2004) high-
lights educational diﬀerences between researchers in incumbent ﬁrms and
entrepreneurs that engage in research. In Rosen (1991) the ex ante high-
cost ﬁrm must spend more than the ex ante low-cost ﬁrm to yield the
same cost level. Through this asymmetry, the former chooses a riskier
research project than the latter.
We present, analyze, and discuss the model in Sections 2, 3, and 4,
respectively. A welfare analysis is in Section 5. After considering an
auction setting in Section 6, we conclude in Section 7. Proofs are in the
Appendix.
4See Fudenberg and Tirole (1986, Ch. 3) and Tirole (1988, pp. 397-398). Also
Beath, Katsoulacos, and Ulph (1989a, 1989b) show that both eﬀects can play a role
in a model similar to RE’s. But again, no clear and simple results can be yielded
(1989a, p. 167).WEINSCHENK: PERSISTENCE OF MONOPOLY 4
2. MODEL
There are two ﬁrms, an incumbent I, and a potential entrant E. At
stage 1 the incumbent decides whether or not to invest in a ﬁrm speciﬁc
research project. Investing causes expected costs of k > 0 and yields an
innovation with probability p ∈ (0,1]. At stage 2 ﬁrm E faces the same
decision. In order to focus on the replacement and the eﬃciency eﬀect we
set both ﬁrms on equal footing and assume that both ﬁrms’ projects have
the same costs and success probabilities. At stage 3 nature independently
determines whether each ﬁrm’s project is successful or not. A successful
ﬁrm gets a process innovation that enables production at per-unit costs
of c. If I does not invest or its project fails, it can produce at per-unit
costs of ¯ c by using its old technology, where ¯ c > c > 0. In contrast, if
E does not invest or its project fails, it cannot produce at all. Finally,
at stage 4, ﬁrms compete ` a la Bertrand. For reasons that will become
clear later, we assume that there is also a stage 0 where ﬁrst the success
probability p is drawn from density g, and then the cost k is drawn from
conditional density h.5
Firms are risk neutral and cannot collude. There is perfect informa-
tion. The solution concept is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Con-
sumer demand is given by the function D(φ), where φ is the consumer
price. We assume that D(φ) is falling in φ, positive for φ = ¯ c+ǫ (where ǫ
is small and positive), and D(c) is ﬁnite. These assumptions allow us to
borrow Tirole’s (1988) analysis of Bertrand proﬁts; see below. To yield
clear-cut normative results we have to assume that monopolist’s optimal
price is unique.6
3. ANALYSIS
We solve the model by backward induction. In this section we ﬁrst de-
scribe the Bertrand proﬁts of ﬁrms. Then we determine their research
decisions. Finally we present the results.
3.1. BERTRAND PROFITS
Bertrand proﬁts are uniquely determined by the ﬁrms’ production costs
and therefore can be expressed as πJ(cI,cE), where J ∈ {I,E}, cI ∈
{¯ c,c}, and cE ∈ {c,−}. The symbol“–”indicates that E cannot produce
5When k is drawn before or simultaneously to p, we can ignore the k value until p
is drawn, and so preserve the vision that p is drawn ﬁrst.
6Hermalin (2009) oﬀers some weak assumptions on D(·) that guarantee inter alia
uniqueness; see his Proposition 3. The key assumption is that D(·) is log-concave.WEINSCHENK: PERSISTENCE OF MONOPOLY 5
at all. We normalize the maximal proﬁt πI(c,−) to 1. The following
lemma on the structure of ﬁrms’ proﬁts is due to Tirole (1988).7
L e m m a 1:
(i) πE(¯ c,−) = πE(c,−) = πE(c,c) = πI(c,c) = πI(¯ c,c) = 0,
(ii) 1 > πI(¯ c,−) > 0,
(iii) 1 ≥ πE(¯ c,c) > 1 − πI(¯ c,−).
Part (i) describes the well-known result that when a ﬁrm cannot pro-
duce or has the same or even higher per-unit costs than its competitor its
Bertrand proﬁt is zero. Part (ii) states that a monopolist is strictly bet-
ter oﬀ with low than with high per-unit costs; nonetheless, a monopolist
with high per-unit costs makes a positive proﬁt. The ﬁrst inequality of
part (iii) contains the eﬃciency eﬀect: since competition destroys indus-
try proﬁts, I’s incentive to remain a monopolist through innovating [and
yield a Bertrand proﬁt of 1] is at least as great as E’s incentive to become
a duopolist [which yields a Bertrand proﬁt of πE(¯ c,c)]. However, when I
takes into account that its old technology is replaced when it innovates
[the net-eﬀect of innovating on its Bertrand proﬁt is just 1−πI(¯ c,−)] E’s
incentive to innovate is higher than I’s. This is the replacement eﬀect
which is captured by the last inequality. When the ﬁrst weak inequal-
ity of (iii) is strict we say that the innovation is non-drastic; in case of
equality the innovation is called drastic.
3.2. RESEARCH DECISIONS
Firm J’s research decision, J ∈ {I,E}, is denoted by aJ ∈ {0,1}, where
0 denotes no investment and 1 investment. We assume that in case of
indiﬀerence a ﬁrm does not invest.8
Potential Entrant’s Research Decision.— Since aI is either 0 or 1,
there are two subgames. Letting bE(aI) denote E’s best responses to aI,
we have
b
E [0] = 1 ⇐⇒ k < π
E(¯ c,c)p =: ¯ k(p); (1)
b
E [1] = 1 ⇐⇒ k < π
E(¯ c,c)(1 − p)p =: k(p). (2)
Thus, E invests if and only if the costs k are suﬃciently low. More
speciﬁcally, if k < k(p), then aE = 1 is E’s dominant strategy and when
7Tirole partially summarizes existing literature. He does not consider the Nash
equilibria found by Blume (2003) where one ﬁrm plays a weakly dominated strategy;
see Tirole (1988, p. 234, footnote 37).
8To rule out that cases of indiﬀerence drive our results we will later introduce an
assumption that guarantees that cases of indiﬀerence have a measure of zero.WEINSCHENK: PERSISTENCE OF MONOPOLY 6
k ≥ ¯ k(p) the dominant strategy is aE = 0. For k ∈ [k(p),¯ k(p)) we have
bE(0) = 1 and bE(1) = 0.
Incumbent’s Research Decision.— I chooses the optimal action
foreseeing E’s later responses. If k ≥ ¯ k(p), then
a
I = 1 ⇐⇒ k < (1 − π
I(¯ c,−))p =: ˆ k(p); (3)
if k < k(p), then
a
I = 1 ⇐⇒ k < (1 − π
I(¯ c,−))(1 − p)p =: ˜ k(p); (4)
and if k ∈ [k(p),¯ k(p)), then
a
I = 1 ⇐⇒ k < p. (5)
Equilibrium.— Using the previous formulas the construction of the
equilibria is straightforward. Figure 1 shows the equilibrium research
decisions, which we denote by a∗ = (aI∗,aE∗). The following lemma
summarizes formally.
πE(¯ c,c)













Figure 1: Research decisions in equilibrium.
L e m m a 2: The ﬁrms’ research decision in equilibrium are
• a∗ = (1,1) for k ∈ [0,˜ k(p));
• a∗ = (0,1) for k ∈ [˜ k(p),k(p));
• a∗ = (1,0) for k ∈ [k(p),¯ k(p));
• a∗ = (0,0) for k ≥ ¯ k(p).
Intuition.— Investments are strategic substitutes. In the parameter
area where k ∈ [k(p),¯ k(p)) E invests if and only if I has not invested.
Hence, I can preempt E. But is it proﬁtable for I to preempt? Yes itWEINSCHENK: PERSISTENCE OF MONOPOLY 7
is, due to the eﬃciency eﬀect: in this parameter area k < p, i.e., (5)
holds. Roughly speaking, I prefers the risk to replace its old technology
itself to the risk being replaced by E. Hence in this parameter set the
equilibrium is a∗ = (1,0). Note, in this parameter set regardless whether
I invests or not, exactly one ﬁrm will invest and so eventually make I’s
old technology obsolete. Consequently, I does not take into account that
its existing technology may be replaced by its own investment and the
replacement eﬀect plays no role.
For low p values preemption is possible only for a relatively small
range of costs, compared to the range of costs where at least one ﬁrm
invests. The line of arguments is as follows. Observe that the probability
that only E receives the innovation when it invests—and thus receives a
positive Bertrand proﬁt—hardly changes through I’s decision. Therefore,
E’s expected proﬁt from research hardly depends on I’s decision. Hence,
preemption is seldom possible. In contrast, for high p values, preemption
is mostly possible; the arguments stated before apply in reverse. So
research is a powerful preemption device if and only if it is likely to
succeed.
Due to the replacement eﬀect, there is a set of parameters where E
is willing to invest, irrespective of what I has done, but where I is no
longer motivated to invest, given that E will invest. Hence in this set
a∗ = (0,1). As explained before, when the success probability p is high,
E’s expected proﬁt from research—and so its willingness to invest—is
very sensitive upon I’s investment decision. Hence the replacement eﬀect
loses its power when p becomes large. In the extreme case of p = 1, it
has no power at all: E never invests when I has invested.
When the costs are very low both ﬁrms are always willing to invest
and hence a∗ = (1,1). In the remaining parameter set, costs are so high
that a∗ = (0,0).
3.3. RESULTS
From Figure 1 or the arguments made before it is intuitive that when the
success probability p is low the replacement eﬀect is “more important”
than the eﬃciency eﬀect, whereas for high p values it is vice versa. To
formalize this intuition, we assume that prior to the ﬁrms’ investment
decisions the costs k and the success probability p are drawn. This is
kind of a comparative statics analysis which allows us to determine how
“important”the diﬀerent equilibria and eﬀects are.
In order to obtain concrete results we make the following assumption
which says that k is uniformly distributed in the “relevant”set.WEINSCHENK: PERSISTENCE OF MONOPOLY 8
A s s u m p t i o n A1: The conditional density of k, h(k|p), is uni-
form in k for (p,k) ∈ S :=
￿
(p,k)|0 < p ≤ 1,0 < k ≤ ¯ k(p)
￿
.
With this assumption we can establish our main result which is about
the probability of investments, conditional on p. Note, we take the per-
spective that k is not yet drawn.
P ro p o s i t i o n 1: Suppose A1 holds. If p is suﬃciently high, I is
more likely to invest in research than E. It is vice versa if p is suﬃciently
low.
Intuitively, given that a high p value was drawn, it is much less likely
that a k will be drawn which lies in the small interval where a∗ = (0,1)
rather than in the large interval where a∗ = (1,0); see Figure 1. For a low
p value it is vice versa. Put diﬀerently, when the success probability is
high it is likely that the incumbent preempts the potential entrant and so
that the eﬃciency eﬀect determines the outcome. This is not true when
the success probability is low. Then the replacement eﬀect predominates.
So both eﬀects are important in our model, and the success probability
determines their relative power.
Taking another view by looking at a large number of I-E-pairs, Propo-
sition 1 predicts that most of the “risky” research is done by potential
entrants but not by incumbents. Incumbents on the other hand specialize
in“safe”research, which is undertaken rarely by potential entrants.9
Perhaps not surprising—albeit nontrivial to prove—is that potential
entrants’ research is“riskier”than that of the incumbent. We measure the
likelihood of failure when neither p nor k is yet drawn. Additionally to
A1 we assume that p is distributed with positive and non-atomic density.
P ro p o s i t i o n 2: Suppose A1 holds and that g(p) has full support
and is ﬁnite ∀p ∈ (0,1]. Then E’s research is more likely to fail than I’s.
The sketch of the proof is as follows: First we show that the likelihood
that I invests relative to the likelihood that E invests is increasing in p.
Then we show that this implies that the distribution of p, conditional
that I invests, ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates the distribution of p,
conditional that E invests. This enables us to ﬁnally prove that E’s
research is more likely to fail than I’s.
What remains to determine is the persistence of monopoly. When E
has invested and is successful, it competes with I on the market. Then
9We say that research is“risky”(“safe”) when p is low (high). This denomination is
cheeky because when p is low the outcome of the research process can be less uncertain
than when p is high.WEINSCHENK: PERSISTENCE OF MONOPOLY 9
the monopoly does not persist. Otherwise the monopoly persists. We
can deliver the following result about the probability of entry (i.e., non-
persistence of the monopoly), conditional on p.
P ro p o s i t i o n 3: Suppose A1 holds. Then the probability of en-
try is at most p(1 − p).
The intuition is simple: When p is low, research is seldom successful
and entry rarely occurs. When p is high, on the other hand, I pre-
empts E except for a small interval of cost realizations; see Proposition
1. Therefore entry is unlikely, too. For intermediate values of p, how-
ever, it is likely that E invests and is successful. Hence, the probability
of entry has roughly an inverted U-shape in p.10 By Proposition 3, the
probability of entry is at most 1/4, which implies that the probability
for the monopoly to persist is at least 3/4.11 Hence we conclude that the
persistence of the monopoly is high.
4. DISCUSSION
4.1. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Baumol (2004) ﬁnds that “risky” research is most often done by en-
trepreneurs and not by incumbents, and that it is vice versa for “safe”
research.12 This ﬁts Proposition 1. Also Vinod Koshla notes that “[r]isk
and acceptance of failure are central to innovation, [...] but the dinosaurs
typically avoid both” (Statement in The Economist, 2007, p. 3). For in-
dustries in which failures are common, our model predicts that most of
the research is done by potential entrants and not by incumbents. This
seems to be the case, for example, in the IT sector.
Proposition 2, which states that E’s research is more likely to fail
than I’s, is supported by Astebo’s (2003, p. 227) ﬁnding that
“the average probability that an independent inventor suc-
ceeds in commercialising his/her invention is estimated to
about 0.07. In comparison, the probability of commercial suc-
cess of conducting R&D in established ﬁrms is approximately
0.27,”
10Ignoring the probability mass outside S (this is possible when one redeﬁnes the
densities g and h accordingly) yields an exact inverted U-shape.
11The reason why the persistence is not lower in our model when the replacement
eﬀect is powerful is that the replacement eﬀect is only strong when research often
fails—and failure of potential entrant’s research is another reason for persistence.
12See also Scherer and Ross (1990, p. 653).WEINSCHENK: PERSISTENCE OF MONOPOLY 10
where the later value is from Mansﬁeld et al. (1977). Further evidence is
provided by Baumol (2004) and Bianchi and Henrekson (2005, p. 367).
Empirically, the persistence of monopolies seems to be high (Geroski,
1995), as Proposition 3 predicts.
4.2. THE ROLE OF ASSUMPTION A1
Scherer and Ross (1990) elucidate how the costs of R&D are distributed.
However, since we use expected costs and normalize them we cannot use
their insights. To us, A1 seems a natural starting point. This assumption
is not as restrictive as it may seem for several reasons. First, A1 assumes
that h(·) is uniform in k for parameters of the set S, but h(·) may still
depend upon p. Second, when the average density of k conditional on p
in the diﬀerent equilibrium sets of S is the same, the proofs, and so also
our results, stay unchanged.13 Third, A1 is suﬃcient, but not necessary,
for our results.
To see the last point, suppose that A1 does not hold. Proposition 1
also holds under the alternative, weak assumption: the average density
of k, conditional on p and that either only I or E invests, is bounded
between two positive constants.14 Additionally observe that then the
probability of entry approaches 0, as p approaches 0 or 1. So at least
roughly the probability of entry has an inverted U-shape in the success
probability of research; cf. Proposition 3.
A1 is important for Proposition 2. When A1 does not hold, the likeli-
hood that I invests relative to the likelihood that E invests can be locally
decreasing in p. Hence, the result stated in Proposition 2 can reverse.
From Figure 1 it is, however, intuitive that for“many distributions”of k
and p the result holds.15
13More technically this means that for all p ∈ (0,1], ¯ h(k ∈ a∗ = (1,0)|p) = ¯ h(k ∈
a∗ = (0,1)|p) = ¯ h(k ∈ a∗ = (1,1)|p), where ¯ h(k ∈ a∗ = i|p) is the average conditional
density of k when k is in equilibrium set i.
14Formally, ¯ h(k ∈ a∗ = i|p) has an inﬁmum and a supremum which are in R++
for all i ∈ {(1,0),(0,1)} and for all p ∈ (0,1]. To understand why this condition
is suﬃcient consider the following example. The supremum is twice as large as the
inﬁmum. Look at Figure 1 and determine the p value for which the interval of k
values with equilibrium a∗ = (1,0) is twice as large as the interval with a∗ = (0,1).
When a p is drawn which lies above this critical value we can be sure that it is more
likely that the costs k will lie in the interval with a∗ = (1,0) than in the interval with
a∗ = (0,1). So it is more likely that I invests in research than that E does. One can
also easily construct a lower critical value of p and show that it is vice versa when p
is low enough.
15Think of a joint probability distribution lying over Figure 1. Ignore the density
when I does not invest. Then calculate I’s center of mass. Make the same steps for
E. For “many distributions”, I’s center is further to the right than E’s.WEINSCHENK: PERSISTENCE OF MONOPOLY 11
4.3. COMPARISON TO THE LITERATURE
In our model each ﬁrm possess one idea, which can be interpreted as
a box. Each box contains either nothing or the innovation.16 To open
its box a ﬁrm has to invest.17 This conception implies that the success
probability of research is exogenous, and if a box turns out empty there
is no way for that ﬁrm to get the innovation. Since each box can be
opened at most once, the game is not repeated.18
The models diﬀer greatly with respect to uncertainty. GN consider
no uncertainty in the research process. In RE the uncertainty eﬀectively
concerns only the arrival date of the innovation, because the game is
repeated unless one ﬁrm is successful. In our model, on the other hand,
it is uncertain whether a ﬁrm’s idea is realizable; see above. This type
of uncertainty is extremely important in reality, see Freeman and Soete
(1997, Ch. 8), Scotchmer (2004, pp. 40, 55), or DiMasi (2001).
In our model research is a powerful preemption device if and only if
it is likely to succeed. In contrast, in GN preemption is always possible,
in RE never. When preemption is possible, it is worthwhile due to the
eﬃciency eﬀect. Consequently, the eﬃciency eﬀect is the driving force in
GN, in our model when the success probability is high, and does not play
a role in RE. When preemption is not possible, the eﬃciency eﬀect is not
important, and the replacement eﬀect steps in. Hence it predominates in
RE, in our model when the success probability is low, and not at all in
GN. Moreover, the probability that a monopoly persists is below one-half
in RE, equal to one in GN, and between three-quarters and one in our
model. Hence, regarding the importance of the relevant eﬀects and the
persistence of monopoly, we take a position between RE and GN.
4.4. TIMING AND ROBUSTNESS
We assumed that ﬁrms decide sequentially about investing in research.
When instead they decide simultaneously, preemption is not possible, and
16With this interpretation nature determines success or failure already at Stage 1.
Since ﬁrms do not know the realization until Stage 3 this modiﬁcation of the timing
does not change the model in any way.
17This description is in line with Scotchmer’s (2004) statements that “[a]n innova-
tion requires both an idea and an investment in it” (p. 39) and that “some research
eﬀorts do not pay oﬀ with certainty ... [and] failures obviously cannot be identiﬁed
in advance” (p. 40).
18An interesting extension would be that ﬁrms have several boxes. However, even
when one assumes that each ﬁrm can open at most one box the analysis gets cumber-
some because the number of cases multiplies. Another interesting extension would be
that ﬁrms can manipulate the type of their box, or that they can inﬂuence upfront
what type they likely will receive.WEINSCHENK: PERSISTENCE OF MONOPOLY 12
our results are no longer valid. While arbitrary from a theoretical point
of view, the assumption of a sequential investment game is not unusual
in the literature and also has an intuitive appeal: First, in contrast to
the incumbent, the potential entrant might need some time to gather
information about the market or to obtain funding. Second, Freeman and
Soete (1997, p. 202) argue that“a ﬁrm which is closely in touch with the
requirements of its customers may recognize potential markets”. So the
incumbent but not the potential entrant, may be quicker in developing
new ideas. Third, with the incumbent being already prominent among
market participants, its activity may be visible for everyone, while the
entrepreneur’s may not. Hence, only the incumbent may be able to
credibly preannounce its investment decision.
In an earlier version of the paper we considered a diﬀerent timing,
where the potential entrant observes incumbent’s success or failure be-
fore it decides about its investment. This does not change our results
substantially. The same is true for the following extensions: (i) heteroge-
nous research costs or success probabilities, (ii) patents,19 (iii) Cournot
competition, (iv) product innovations, and (v) correlated success proba-
bilities.
5. WELFARE ANALYSIS
In Section 3 we analyzed the positive aspects of our model. Now we
explore the normative implications. In the second best world where prices
cannot be regulated we seek to answer the question whether there is
too much or too little investment from a welfare point of view. The
literature (see Tirole 1988, p. 399) has found two counteracting eﬀects.
First, there is the nonappropriability of social surplus eﬀect: ﬁrms may
underinvest because the innovator typically does not receive the whole
social surplus created by its innovation. Second, ﬁrms may overinvest due
to the business stealing eﬀect: the innovator may not take into account
that it steals the rival’s business.
19Our non-extended model can be interpreted in two ways: (i) There are no patents
and each ﬁrm keeps details of its innovation secret so that an outsider cannot imitate.
This interpretation is empirically justiﬁed because“patents are regarded as a necessary
incentive for innovation in only a few industries” (Cohen 1995, p. 227). See also
Scotchmer (2004, Ch. 9). (ii) There are patents but both ﬁrms innovations are
diﬀerent in the sense that each ﬁrm can get a patent on its technology. Additionally
note, that there are patents in RE and GN is not crucial for their results: Without
patents and with Bertrand competition a ﬁrm no longer wants to engage in research
when its competitor was already successful.WEINSCHENK: PERSISTENCE OF MONOPOLY 13
P ro p o s i t i o n 4: When the innovation is non-drastic and the in-
cumbent preempts the potential entrant then ﬁrms may overinvest. In
all other cases ﬁrms do not overinvest and may underinvest.
We ﬁrst give the intuition for the case where the innovation is non-
drastic and the incumbent preempts the potential entrant. When incum-
bent’s research is successful it may set a price which is almost the same as
when it would have the old technology. So the consumer surplus is hardly
aﬀected through the innovation. That is, the nonappropriability of social
surplus eﬀect is weak. Observe that through the threat of entry, the in-
cumbent is“forced”to steal its own business. Hence the business stealing
eﬀect is powerful and may dominate. Put diﬀerently, no investment of
both ﬁrms may be socially desirable.
In contrast, when the innovation is drastic, the successful incumbent
sets a much lower price than it would set without the innovation. So the
expected consumer surplus increases greatly and the nonappropriability
eﬀect dominates. Similar arguments apply for the case where only the
potential invests.
One may presume that when both ﬁrms invest this may not be socially
desirable: research eﬀort is duplicated and so both ﬁrms may yield the
innovation. This suspicion is false. When both ﬁrms are successful the
consumer price is only c, which results in a dominant nonappropriability
eﬀect.
Subsidies.— Suppose that the only policy instrument of a gov-
ernment is a research subsidy. Through subsidies the government can
change ﬁrms’ investment decisions, since ﬁrms determine their invest-
ments on the basis of the net costs. Proposition 4 shows that subsidies
are especially relevant to support drastic innovations because for these
innovations ﬁrms sometimes underinvest but never overinvest.
Targeting subsidies to potential entrants and not to incumbents has
two potential advantages. First, the equilibrium a∗ = (0,1) is socially
weakly preferred to a∗ = (1,0).20 Second, promising a subsidy to E in
case that it invests can push I to preempt E. Hence, the subsidy is not
paid. Nonetheless a previously unexplored research project may now be
investigated.
20When the innovation is non-drastic the preference is strict: total welfare is higher
when there is a duopoly in which E has the innovation than in a monopoly where I
has it.WEINSCHENK: PERSISTENCE OF MONOPOLY 14
6. EXTENSION: AUCTION SETTING
GN’s research process is commonly interpreted as a ﬁrst-price auction
with complete and perfect information (Reinganum, 1984). Next, we
integrate such an auction setting and show that our results change sub-
stantially.
Suppose I and E bid for the service of a ﬁrm which implements a
research project for the winner.21 The auction is held before it is clear
whether the research project will be successful.22 A ﬁrm’s valuation is
its willingness to pay for victory, i.e., the diﬀerence in its expected proﬁt
between winning and losing.
P ro p o s i t i o n 5: The incumbent always wins if the innovation is
non-drastic.
So with an auction setting and a non-drastic innovation there never
is entry. This result coincides completely with GN.23 Intuitively, since
I can always outbid E, preemption is always possible. Given that the
innovation is non-drastic, then, by virtue of the eﬃciency eﬀect, I’s val-
uation is strictly higher than E’s, and preemption is indeed worthwhile.
In contrast, when the innovation is drastic ﬁrms’ valuations are the same
and one has to specify a tie-breaking rule. However, if there is only a
bit of uncertainty whether an innovation is indeed drastic, I’s valuation
is higher than E’s, and so I will win the auction. Hence generically, E
never does research, and entry never occurs. This insight is new.
7. CONCLUSIONS
We presented a simple model in which both, the replacement and the
eﬃciency eﬀect are present. We showed that research is a powerful pre-
emption device if and only if it is likely to succeed. This results in the
predominance of the eﬃciency eﬀect when the success probability of re-
search is high and the predominance of the replacement eﬀect when it is
low.
21This need not be taken literally. GN’s interpretation is that the ﬁrms are in a
race, and the ﬁrm which invests most wins. Another is that ﬁrms compete for scarce
and essential resources, and so only the ﬁrm which invests the most gets them.
22The alternative timing is that the auction is held afterwards. Then either a project
with a success probability of one or zero is auctioned. In the latter case holding an
auction is superﬂuous. The former case is a just special case in the setting of the
original timing. Hence, the alternative timing needs no separate investigation.
23We allow for an uncertain research process. GN consider uncertainty only verbally,
but it is not clear to us what type of uncertainty they mean. Yi (1995) couples an
auction with RE’s model, and his result is that the entrant will never do research.WEINSCHENK: PERSISTENCE OF MONOPOLY 15
8. APPENDIX
It is useful to deﬁne  J(p) as the probability that ﬁrm J ∈ {I,E} will




as the probability that
entry will occur. Both variables are measured after p and before k is
drawn.
8.1. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1

























So  I(p) >  E(p) if and only if it is more likely that the replacement
eﬀect will determine the outcome than that the eﬃciency eﬀect will.
Using A1, (6) is
p
2π
E(¯ c,c) > (1 − p)p
￿
π




So  I(p) >  E(p) if (and only if)
p > ˙ p :=
πE(¯ c,c) − (1 − πI(¯ c,−))
2πE(¯ c,c) − (1 − πI(¯ c,−))
.
From Lemma 1 follows that ˙ p ∈ (0,1). Similarly,  I(p) <  E(p) if (and
only if) p < ˙ p. Note, the “only if” part is not included in Proposition 1
because it is an artefact of the uniform assumption upon h. ￿
8.2. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2














is the density of p, conditional that J ∈ {I,E} invests. The associated
distribution function is denoted by GJ(p). We seek to show that P I >
P E.
























and ﬁnite ∀p ∈ (0,1).
Step 2. Claim: gI(p) < gE(p) for p → 0 and gI(p) > gE(p) for
p → 1.
Proof: Since g(p) and  J(p) are positive and ﬁnite ∀p ∈ (0,1], it






/dp > 0 ∀p ∈ (0,1), and by deﬁnition
R 1
0 gI(p)dp = 1 and
R 1
0 gE(p)dp = 1. Hence it must hold that gI(p) < gE(p) for p → 0, and
gI(p) > gE(p) for p → 1.
Step 3. Claim: there exists a ˜ p ∈ (0,1) such that gI(p) = (<,>)gE(p)
for p = (<,>)˜ p.




dp is positive and ﬁnite ∀p ∈ (0,1).
So
gI(p)
gE(p) is continuous and increasing in p, ∀p ∈ (0,1). This implies,
together with the intermediate value theorem and step 2, that there exists
a ˜ p ∈ (0,1) such that gI(˜ p) = gE(˜ p). Since
gI(p)
gE(p) is increasing in p
∀p ∈ (0,1), and gI(p) < (>)gE(p) for p → 0(1) by step 2, it holds that
gI(p) < (>)gE(p) for p < (>)˜ p.
Step 4. By Proposition 6.D.1 in Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Greene








E(p)dp ∀x ∈ (0,1]. (7)
We seek to show a slightly diﬀerent property.
Claim: The inequality in (7) is strict ∀x ∈ (0,1).




0 gE(p)dp.WEINSCHENK: PERSISTENCE OF MONOPOLY 17





0 gE(p)dp is false.















0 gI(p)dp = 1 and
R 1
0 gE(p)dp = 1. From step 3, ∀p ∈ (˜ p,1) it
is true that gI(p) > gE(p). From Lemma 2 follows that gE(1) = 0. By
deﬁnition gI(1) ≥ 0. Hence, (8) is false.
Step 5. Using the deﬁnition of P E and P I, we get by integrating by
parts that
P










From step 4 we know that GI(p) < GE(p) ∀p ∈ (0,1). By deﬁnition




0 GE(p)dp and so P I > P E. ￿
8.3. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3









Together with Lemma 2 this implies that
 
E(p) = h(p)π




E(¯ c,c)(1 − p)p = 1 − p.
Since, by deﬁnition τ(p) = p E(p), it follows that τ(p) ≤ p(1 − p). ￿
8.4. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
The total welfare, excluding potential investments in research, when the
incumbent has production costs cI and the potential entrant costs cE
is denoted by t(cI,cE). It consists of the ﬁrms’ Bertrand proﬁts and





















where φJ(cI,cE) is the price set by ﬁrm J ∈ {I,E}. Let T(aI,aE) be the
expected total welfare taking into account ﬁrms’ investments. Straight-
forward calculations yield:
T(0,0) = t(¯ c,−),
T(0,1) = pt(¯ c,c) + (1 − p)t(¯ c,−) − k,
T(1,0) = pt(c,−) + (1 − p)t(¯ c,−) − k,
T(1,1) = p
2t(c,c) + p(1 − p)t(c,−)
+p(1 − p)t(¯ c,c) + (1 − p)
2t(¯ c,−) − 2k.
Observe that for a drastic innovation φE(¯ c,c) = φI(c,−) and so T(0,1) =
T(1,0). However, when the innovation is non-drastic φE(¯ c,c) < φI(c,−)
and so T(0,1) > T(1,0). Next we explore the question whether there is
socially too much or too little investment. We look at the second best
world in which pricing cannot be regulated.
Overinvestment when a∗ = (1,0)?— Consider ﬁrst the case that in
equilibrium only the incumbent invests. Is it socially desirable that no
ﬁrm invests? Using the formulas derived before yields








From Lemma 2 we know that for a∗ = (1,0),
k = pπ
E(¯ c,c) − (+term),WEINSCHENK: PERSISTENCE OF MONOPOLY 19
where the positive term can be arbitrarily small. Then










For a drastic innovation, πI(c,−) = πE(¯ c,c). The proﬁt term πI(¯ c,−)




Since we assumed that the monopolist’ optimal price is unique we have
that for a drastic innovation φI(c,−) ≤ ¯ c. Hence, T(1,0) − T(0,0) > 0.
However, when the innovation is non-drastic, then it can be the case
that T(1,0)−T(0,0) < 0. This is true in the following example: (+term)
is small; φI(¯ c,−) ≈ φI(c,−) so that the integral term in (9) is small; let
πI(c,−) − πI(¯ c,−) be well below πE(¯ c,c) (this is possible due to the
replacement eﬀect).
Overinvestment when a∗ = (0,1)?— When in equilibrium only E
invests, is it socially desirable that no ﬁrm invests?








From Lemma 2, when a∗ = (0,1) then
k = π










Are the terms in the square brackets also positive if p → 0? Yes, since










I(¯ c,−))dφ = π
I(¯ c,−).
Obviously, for all p the terms in the square brackets are positive, and so
it holds that T(0,1) − T(0,0) > 0.
Overinvestment when a∗ = (1,1)?— Next consider the case whenWEINSCHENK: PERSISTENCE OF MONOPOLY 20
both ﬁrms invest in research. Is it socially desirable that instead only



















From Lemma 2 we know that when a∗ = (1,1), then
k = p(1 − p)(π
I(c,−) − π
I(¯ c,−)) − (+term).
Using this we get that
T(1,1) − T(0,1) = p
"
p





+ (1 − p)





The second integral is nonnegative because φI(c,−) ≤ φI(¯ c,−), see Tirole
(1988, p. 66). The term
R φE(¯ c,c)








which is positive because demand is decreasing in the price and φE(¯ c,c) >
c. Hence, T(1,1) − T(0,1) > 0.
We know that T(0,1) ≥ T(1,0). Hence also T(1,1) − T(1,0) > 0.
Finally, is T(1,1) socially preferred to T(0,0)?
T(1,1) − T(0,0) = p
2 [t(c,c) − t(c,−) − t(¯ c,c) + t(¯ c,−)]
+ p[t(c,−) + t(¯ c,c) − 2t(¯ c,−)] − 2k.
Again, for a∗ = (1,1) it holds that
k = p(1 − p)(π
I(c,−) − π
I(¯ c,−)) + (+term).WEINSCHENK: PERSISTENCE OF MONOPOLY 21


























If p = 1, one gets that




I(¯ c,−) + (+term),
which is obviously positive.
If p → 0, only the last line of (10) is important. The replacement
eﬀect holds and so πE(¯ c,c)−πI(c,−) = −πI(¯ c,−)+(+term), see Lemma











From before (see the case a∗ = (0,1)) we know that
R φI(¯ c,−)
φE(¯ c,c) D(φ)dφ >
πI(¯ c,−), and so the last line is positive. Hence, also for p → 0, T(1,1)−
T(0,0) > 0. Since for p = 1 and for p → 0 we have T(1,1)−T(0,0) > 0,
and through the functional form of (10), we get that T(1,1)−T(0,0) > 0
∀p ∈ (0,1].
Underinvestment.— Note, when a∗ = (0,0) the previous analysis
of the case a∗ = (1,0) applies expect that there is no positive term,
but instead a negative term. When k is close to the boundary where
a∗ = (1,0), the negative term is close to zero. Hence, our analysis shows
that it may be socially desirable that one ﬁrm invests when in fact no
ﬁrm invests. The same arguments hold when in fact one ﬁrm invests
and one asks the question whether investments of both ﬁrms is socially
preferable. Hence, ﬁrm may invest too little. ￿
8.5. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
Denote ﬁrm J’s valuation as vJ, J ∈ {I,E}. I’s valuation vI is given
through the k which equates (5), and so vI = p. Similarly, from (1) we
get vE = πE(¯ c,c)p. If the innovation is non-drastic, πE(¯ c,c) < 1, andWEINSCHENK: PERSISTENCE OF MONOPOLY 22
hence vI > vE ∀p ∈ (0,1]. Since we consider a ﬁrst-price auction with
complete and perfect information, I will always win. ￿
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